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attempt to find tllese good reasons wifuin Rawls's own
tlleoretical proclivities (fue second possible strategy)
or-a third type ofproject-introduce new fuemes which
are independent of, even contrary to, some of Rawls's
basic commiunents. On tllis last strategy, one would be
arguing tllat fue notion of an original position can be
used in contexts ofuer tllan the Rawlsian one to generate
a concept of justice tllat wouJld be, in VanDeVeer's
terms, "interspecific."3 Of course, all of fuese attacks
presuppose fue more basic claim fuat it is logically
possible to include animals in the original position.
In tllis paper, I shall only briefly comment on fue
argument that inclusion does not lead to logical
absurdity; Rawls's critics, most 1l10tably VanDeVeer, are
correct in noting tllat tlle original position already has
in place tlle mechanisms by which fue interests of
animals could be considered in tlle same way as tllose
of humans. I shall argue tllat any attempt to force an
expansion of fue original position fails, and tllat Rawls
is quite justified in restricting Ithe argument so fuat it
does not apply to most animals. While the critics
apparently take themselves to be engaged in arguments
of fue first or second sort, tlley must, at best, content
tllemselves witll sometlling like tlle tllird strategy. In
order to see why, we must first examine tlle concept of
tlle original position and tllen step back for a sense of
fue broader context in which talk of fue original position
is embedded. The description of Rawls will necessarily

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls l defends two
principles of justice by means of an appeal to a
hypothetical "original position." However, these
principles are strictly principles of justice by and for
human beings, or at least by and for persons. Several
philosophers have recently argued that tllis argument is
flawed-is "speciesist"-in tllat there is no adequate
justification for excluding animals from consideration
as beings to whom fue principles of justice ought to
apply.2 If tllose in tlle original position had to consider
tlle possibility tllat tlley might be reborn as a calf ratller
than a human, they might well choose different
principles. If tlley did not consider that possibility, the
original position, and the "veil of ignorance" which
helps define it, would fail to protect against prejudice
or guarantee fairness and impartiality.
One must be careful to distinguish at fue outset
different bases for objecting to the exclusion of
nonhuman animals from Rawls's tlleory. One might
argue tllat Rawls simply cannot exclude animals from
his tlleory, that doing so is internally inconsistent.
Alternatively, one might argue that while animals can
consistently be excluded, tllere are good reasons for
including them. This line of argument might eitller
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This is the point at which VanDeVeer raises his
challenge. If people in tlle original position are not
allowed to act on the knowledge that they will be
"sophisticated reasoners," it seems equally legitimate
to insist that they should not be allowed tlle knowledge
that tlley are moral persons at all. 5 Doing so would
encourage those in the original position to adopt
principles that would protect nonhuman animals,
without the absurd requirement that they must formulate
these principles using only the limited capacities of such
animals. It is as if Rawls recognizes that sophisticated
intellectual ability should not be a morally relevant
characteristic in determining just treatment, and so sets
up tlle original position to make sure tllat it will not be
favored by the chosen principles. Buthe simply assumes
without argument tllat being a rational (though not
necessarily moral) agent or moral person is morally
relevant, and hence allows that information to be
accessible, even under the veil of ignorance. In
VanDeVeer's words:

be oversimplified, but tlle relevant portions of the
argument can be identified.
Rawls argues for his two principles of justice by
appealing to "the original position," a hypothetical
situation in which "free and equal" individuals choose
the principles ofjustice tllat seem to tllem most rational
and advantageous-principles to which they would
voluntarily accede (TOJ, pp.12-13). To insure
impartiality, we must imagine that tllese deliberations
take place behind a "veil of ignorance"; the participants
have no knowledge of social or economic status, gender,
particular talents or abilities, or "particular inclinations
and aspirations" (TOJ, p. 18). Rawls claims that
individuals in this position would choose tlle following
two principles:
First: each person is to have an equal right to
the most extensive basic liberty compatible
with a similar liberty for others. Second:
social and economic inequalities are to be
arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably
expected to be to everyone's advantage and
(b) attached to positions and offices open to
all. (TOJ, p. 60)

Should not the veil of ignorance exclude tlle
knowledge that members of tlle society [i.e.,
all individuals whose treatment is dictated by
the principles chosen in the original position]
will have a concept of their good or of
justice? .. The rationale of a veil of ignorance,
on Rawls's own view, is to guarantee impartial
consideration of principles. 6

Both principles tell us only about the proper
treatment of persons. If 'person' does not include most
nonhuman animals, adoption of tllese principles alone
would still allow for the most egregious mistreatment
of animals, and this gives rise to tlle criticism under
consideration. 4 The challenge is most forcefully posed
by Donald VanDeVeer, who argues that we can
redescribe tlle original position without lapsing into tlle
conceptual incoherence of trying to imagine that we
have a person, a dog and a pig deciding which principles
to choose. Moreover, he argues tllat we must redescribe
it in order to guarantee faimess, or else it will fail to
function as Rawls intended it to.
People in the original position are envisaged as a
fairly sophisticated bunch. They are rational, can
recognize a valid argument when one occurs to them,
and can grasp complicated economic calculations such
as maximin. However, if they knew tllat they would be
that clever in "real life," they would tend to choose
principles that would give favored treatment to clever
people. Thus, tlle veil of ignorance is constructed to
preclude that sort of inequality: tllOse in tlle original
position must find principles tllat tlley could accept even
if they tum out to be ill eqnipped to do moral philosophy.
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If VanDeVeer is correct, Rawls has no adequate
justification for assuming that the original position
should allow those choosing the principles to proceed
on the assumption that they will be moral persons;
indeed, such an assumption would lead to just the sort
of self-interested prejudice that the veil of ignorance
was meruIt to prevent. If they are not entitled to tllat
assumption, VanDeVeer suggests tllat they would
choose different principles:

tlley might choose principles which preclude
treatment of any sentient creature (not posing
a serious threat to others) which would render
no life at all for tllat creature, on balance,
... preferable to its living. I call tllis the LifePreferability Principle.?
In short, the problem to be addressed is whetller it
is legitimate to justify one's choice of principles by
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be built into tile description of tile original position.
The choice and ordering of tile two principles ofjustice
is then no surprise, since the original position is intended
to reflect tilis prior commitment to tile moral significance of an ability to act as an individual, more
specifically an ability to choose and act on a life-plan
of one's own. This emphasis on individuality is, again,
sometiling that classical utilitarianism is supposed to
be unable to accommodate. 8
All of this suggests tilree possible criticisms of
Rawls:

appeal to an original position in which tile participants
are allowed to assume that tiley are/will be moral
persons, as tilat concept is defined by Rawls. Going
back to our second and tilird strategies, we can first ask
whetiler tile Rawlsian framework provides any reason
for doing so and, second, consider whetiler abandoning
Rawls at tilis point yields a more satisfactory tileory.
VanDeVeer does not distinguish tilese two tactics, but
since I shall argue tilat tile first will not work, he can at
best hope for tile second.
To determine how a Rawlsian might respond to
VanDeVeer's challenge, we must go back to an essential
aspect of Rawls's starting point: his rejection of
utilitarianism. I do not wish to re-examine his reasons
for that rejection here but merely to note timt it is
essential to his tileory: any attempt to extend or modify
tile description of tile original position in a Rawlsian
spirit must be consistent with that rejection of
utilitarianism. More specifically, tile entire idea of an
original position and tile veil of ignorance is presented
as an alternative to utilitarianism; therefore, any
criticism of Rawls's strategy must be consistent witil
tile rejection of utilitarianism iliat motivates tile strategy,
or else must reach furtiler and attack the anti-utilitarian
arguments on which tile original position is based.
We can frame tile same point in a more positive light.
Describing tile original position is tile second step in
an argument which begins by arguing tilat a tileory of
justice must, above all, be structured so as to avoid what
Rawls has already argued is the main flaw of
utilitarianism: tile failure to respect individuality. Rawls
seems to assume what otilers have argued for: to respect
individuality one must reject the idea tilat it is rational
(rationally obligatory?) to have no or less interest in
tile fulfillment of one's own desires as in the fulfillment
of anotiler being's equally strong interest.
If one rejects utilitarianism in favor of respect for
individuality, one moves inevitably, as Rawls does,
toward a system which protects the individual's ability
to choose and carry out his/her own plans, to further
her/his own purposes. In Rawls, this is carried one step
furtiler: the sense of individuality which carries moral
weight involves having and caring about a life-plan.
Thus, he defines moral persons as having "a conception
of tileir good (as expressed by a rational plan of life)"
(TOJ, p. 505, my emphasis). Whether all of tilese
conclusions follow from a rejection of utilitarianism
remains to be seen, but that is how, in Rawls, the notion
of moral personhood is developed and how it comes to
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1. He has not adequately justified his first step,

the rejection of utilitarianism in favor of a
tileory tilat puts primary weight on freedom and
moral personhood.
2. The description of tile original position does not
follow from tile first step, and cannot be justified
by appeal to it.
3. There is an inconsistency in the overall argument,
and tile burden of proof is on Rawls, not tile critic,
to diagnose tile source of tile problem.
The first criticism might lead us to abandon some basic
elements of tile Rawlsian view and perhaps follow tile
tilird strategy described at tile beginning of tilis paper.
The second criticism leads naturally to tile second
strategy, and the third criticism follows tile first strategy.
Let us consider each of these in tum.
The first-a frontal attack on Rawls's rejection of
utilitarianism, and his consequent emphasis on respect
for tile individual agent or subject-is certainly open
to fierce debate, as demonstrated by numerous
commentators on Rawls. Moreover, it is not limited to
concerns about animals: tile controversy will not center
on tile exclusion of animals but, ratiler, on general
considerations for or against utilitarianism.
Despite its apparent attractiveness, I propose not to
evaluate this tactic. My primary justification fordoing
so is that the criticisms leveled against Rawls's
exclusion of animals have not objected specifically to
this aspect of the argument. Two otiler reasons reinforce
this inclination. First, any dispube over tilis starting point
is not peculiar to concerns about animals: it can be, and
has been, raised purely within tile context of duties,
obligations, and justice toward anyone or anything who
is not a moral person in the relevant sense-and tilis
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presented as a consequence of the rejection of
utilitarianism. Once one grants that much, it follows
that those in the original position are justified in
assuming that they will not be reincarnated as anything
other than a human being or perhaps a member of one
of a very select and limited group of species. As hinted
at above, there may be a sense of "individuality" which
at the same time preserves the force of the objection to
utilitarianism while at the same time demanding less
than Rawls demands of moral persons, but such amiddle
ground has not been successfully delineated. IS
The third strategy in attacking Rawls is simply to
point out an inconsistency and leave it to the Rawlsian
to decide how to fix it. Those who have pursued this
course have identified such an inconsistency, the
discussion of so-called "marginal cases".16 Although
the inconsistency is real, the modification of Rawls's
position on this point that seems most consistent with
his overall theory is not one that results in animals being
considered in the original position.
The tenn "marginal cases" refers to human beings
who are so severely retarded or brain damaged that they
lack the most rudimentary ability to make conscious,
deliberate, rational choices. We can restrict the field
even further by specifying that they are individuals who
never had such abilities, and have no realistic chance
of ever acquiring them, since individuals in the original
position may want to take into account the fact that they
will start life as helpless infants and may be the subject
of an accident or disease that could destroy their ability
to function as a moral person (TOI, pp. 248-250). Such
"marginal cases" are clearly less able to construct or
follow a life plan than a pig or a hamster,17 yet Rawls
still accords them protection that he does not extend to
nonhuman animals. It should be noted immediately that
Rawls's discussion of this topic is both tentative and
equivocal (TOI pp. 248-250, 506-510). If we accept
his critics' assumption that those in the original position
would extend the principles of justice to aU human
beings, even marginal cases, then Rawls is guilty of
inconsistency. But the inconsistency is easily remedied,
if indeed it is supported by the text at all.
Given Rawls's commitment to liberty, moral
personhood, and the importance of freedom to choose,
the only solution consistent with a Rawlsian framework
would be to accept that marginal cases are not included
in considerations of justice. This, however, should not
horrify us, because it does not leave marginal cases
without any moral protection. Rawls takes pains to

would include some human beings. Therefore, such an
objection would not support the specific charge of
speciesism. Second, several debates within the "ethics
and animals" literature serve to reinforce the Rawlsian
line that utilitarianism (at least in its classical guise)
pays insufficient attention to the status of the individual.
Regan's emphasis on the moral status ofbeing a "subject
of a life"9 and even Peter Singer's qualified position on
replaceabilitylO move us in a direction congenial to
Rawls's first premise. The sense of "individuality" (as
opposed to merely being a receptacle of pleasurable
experiences) which is morally relevant is sure to be hotly
debated, but until one argues (as someone like Regan
might want toll but has not explicitly done) that Rawls
has set the standard for "subject" too high, this first
method of attack on Rawls must be discounted.
The second strategy would be to argue that Rawls's
rejection of utilitarianism does not justify the most
common interpretation of the description of the original
position: that it does not warrant allowing those in the
original position to assume that they will not be
'incarnated' as nonhuman animals. I think this
complaint is correct but achieves only a very minor
victory for two reasons. Rawls himself emphasizes
moral personhood, not biological facts about membership in the species Homo sapiens, as a crucial factor. 12
Thus, a few nonhuman animals, perhaps dolphins or
gorillas, might be capable of fonnulating a rational life
plan and valuing it because it is their own life plan;
they would thereby qualify as the sort of beings that
participants in the original position ought to include in
their considerations. Nonetheless, the best scientific
evidence we have to date would indicate that this is a
plausible hypothesis only with a very small number of
species: it will not, for example, save the veal calf or
the laboratory rat. Elliot does not think this is an obstacle
to including animals, because we can still "think
ourselves into their position" and make reasonable
inferences about what sort of life would be preferable
to and for them. I 3 This, however, misses the point: the
issue is not whether nonhuman animals prefer one sort
of life to another but whether the very choosing of a
life-plan of one's own is important to them.
According to Rawls's argument, those in the original
position, even though they do not know what their lifeplan will be, are supposed to know that they will have a
rational life plan, i.e., to know that following plan A
rather than plan B matters simply because one has
chosen A rather than B. 14 This, as noted earlier, is
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are only a start, they do point in what I believe is the
right direction.

admit that the theory of justice is not meant as a
complete moral theory (1DJ, p. 512) and we might well
have many good reasons for extending special
protection to marginal cases. IS The possibility for
inconsistency exists, in that the full but as yet
unarticulated moral theory could turn out to accord
protection to marginal cases lhat it denies to animals
without sufficient reason, but that hypothetical
possibility does not pose a serious threat to the theory
of justice as presented by Rawls.
To sum up: we can describe a theory of justice that
is consistent in both letter and spirit with Rawls's that
has the following characteristics:
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1. Rawls is justified in specifying that all those in
the original position may assume that they will
be moral persons in the society to be governed by
the principles which they choose. Thus, the
principles of justice which they choose might
easily tum out not to cover many who are not
moral persons.

3 Donald VanDeVeer, "Interspecific Justice," Inquiry,
(1979), pp. 55-79.
4 In this paper, I propose to set aside Regan's charge in
"Duties to Animals: Rawls' Dilemma," Ethics and Animals,
vol. 2 (1981), pp. 76-82 (see also The CaseforAnimalRights,
pp. 167-170) that Rawls is guilty of a simple inconsistency in
his treatment of natural duties. Alan Fuchs has, I believe,
successfully rebutted this charge in "Duties to Animals:
Rawls' Alleged Dilemma," Ethics andAnimals, vol. 2 (1981),
pp. 83-88. Fuchs argues that Rawls's account of natural duties
does not include the duty not to be cruel to animals. Although
Rawls does acknowledge that duty elsewhere (TOJ, p. 512),
it is not a natural duty in the sense Regan is worried about. As
Fuchs points out, Rawls states several times that his theory
of justice was never intended to be a complete moral theory
and strongly suggests that our treatment of animals might well
be restricted by moral principles which, while valid, fall
outside the scope of a theory of justice.

2. Nonetheless, some individuals who are not
included as moral persons, or (not necessarily
equivalently) those to whom the principles of
justice apply, may be moral subjects: our complete
moral theory of duties and obligations may show
that we have direct moral duties toward some who
are not moral persons, e.g. marginal cases and
nonhuman animals.
3. It is not a foregone conclusion that marginal cases
and nonhuman animals cannot be accorded
differential treatment without lapsing into
speciesism, but any attempt to justify differential
treaunent must still be produced.

S Rawls takes the necessary and sufficient conditions for
moral personhood to be something like: (a) having one's own
ends, a conception of one's own good, or a life plan and an
interest in following it, and (b) having the capacity for a sense
of justice (p. 505; cf pp. 12, 19). We shall see presently that
this definition of "moral person" is fraught with difficulties.
It should be emphasized at the outset, however, that moral
personhood is not restricted by definition to anyone biological
species; nor is it equivalent to "moral subject." That is, Rawls's
argument allows for the possibility that beings who are not
Homo sapiens might be moral persons and explicitly agrees
that we have moral obligations that are owed to beings who
are not moral persons in his sense.

The implications of this issue extend beyond an
abstract interest in the intemal consistency of A Theory
ofJustice; they provide important clues about what an
adequate account of our duties toward animals might
look like. There are at least two lessons to leam. First,
the notion that being a moral person or subject is morally
relevant has not yet been impeached; it deserves further
consideration and elaboration as an important difference
between most humans and most nonhuman animals.
Second, any attempt to build a theory on such a
foundation must take care to avoid inconsistency in its
treaUnent of marginal cases. Although lhese two points
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6VanDeVeer, pp. 371-372. It should be noted that, at least
in principle, VanDeVeer's notion of "members of society" is
broader than Rawls's "moral person". It is certainly logically
possible that participants in the original position might decide
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A. To understand whether participants in the original
position could be incarnated as nonhuman animals,
we need to understand what the original position
is supposed to accomplish.
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B. The original position was set up in response to
Rawls's dissatisfactions with utilitarianism,
principally to overcome (what he believes to be)
utilitarianism's failure to respect individuality.

14Cf. Rawls, p. 142.
15Again, this is predicated on serious doubts about Regan's
analysis of a "subject-of-a-life". Cf. fn. 10.
16 VanDeVeer and Regan both discuss this point, although
it does not seem to be the major focus in either case.

C. Individuality, in the morally significant sense,
involves having and caring about a life-plan.

17 This comparison tacitly recognizes an additional
complicating factor that is not discussed in this paper: the
fact that being a moral person may well be a matter of degree.
I do not think this simplification affects the analysis of the
arguments under analysis here, since none of them mentions
this dimension, but it is dangerous to ignore it entirely.

D. Consequently, the participants in the original
position can be assured of being incarnated only
as beings capable of having and caring about lifeplans, so-called "moral persons," because only such
beings are the object of the original position exercise.

18 For more on this topic, see Michael Wreen, "In Defense
of Speciesism," Ethics and Animals, vol 3 (1982), pp. 47-60,
and James Lindemann Nelson, "Animals, Handicapped
Children, and the Tragedy of Handicapped Cases," Journal
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E. Very few, if any, nonhuman animals are capable of
having and caring about life-plans.

F. Consequently, the participants in the original
position can be assured that with, at most, very few
exceptions, they will be incarnated as human beings.
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